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Tom Rockmore - - Ars Disputandi 3. On the Structure of Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Tom Rockmore - - Metaphilosophy 35 4: Kant in the Twentieth Century.
Meaning, Knowledge and Value: Routledge History of Philosophy Volume X. Pojman - - Oup Usa.
Tom Rockmore, In Kant's Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century - PhilPapers
Philosophy of Language in the Twentieth Century. Then he focuses, in turn, on the diachronic developments of Marxism ch.
The five stories are framed by a methodological chapter on the problem of interpreting twentieth-century philosophy ch. Three more or less explicitly-stated interpretive principles run through each of Rockmore's historical narratives. The first, as I have already mentioned, is the grand unifying hypothesis of the essentially protean character of Kant's first Critique and the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. The second is that each distinct philosophical movement is [End Page ] fundamentally organized around the teachings and writings of a few "master" or "strong" thinkers And the third is that the history of philosophy is nothing but a multi-voiced Socratic conversation Everyone knows how even the most intensely animated intellectual conversation can end with an inconclusive whimper instead of a conclusive bang.
According to Rockmore, that is basically what happened to the great philosophical conversation of the twentieth century.
In Kant's Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century
In the chapter on Kant, Rockmore usefully distinguishes between two strands of transcendental idealism that Kant regarded as fully complementary, but which tended to run and pull in sharply opposite directions in post-Kantian philosophy: Now Kant's transcendental idealism says four things. First, cognition is the mental representation of objects.
Second, the objects we cognize are nothing but appearances or phenomena and never things-in-themselves or noumena. Third, the generic structure of the objects and the world we cognize is identical to the non-empirical or a priori generic structure of the innate cognitive capacities or faculties of our minds.