In Vietnam, men and women enjoy equal rights to vote and stand for elections. In the same year, female candidates won in total seats Since then, women have made up a substantial proportion roughly a quarter of the National Assembly. In two terms and , the number fell to However, since , the number of women elected has rise to Currently, Vietnam ranks 2nd in Asia and 35th among countries listed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in terms of the percentage of women in parliament lower or single house IPU b.
Instead of dividing explanatory factors according to macro-, meso- and micro-level variables, the paper groups variables into institutional and socioeconomic factors. One of the most direct factors that significantly manipulates the number of women in parliament is the electoral system. In these systems, the competitions are generally perceived as less competitive. Women have more chance to win seats as long as they manage to get on the party lists. On the contrary, majority systems based on single-member districts are the less favorable due to their vigorous competitions.
The situation in Vietnam does not particularly fall into either category, but in general, is in favor of women. In Vietnam, the voting system is absolute majority. The country is divided into multi-member constituencies with no more than three candidates elected in each unit. Although the competition is very high in this system due to majority voting , the fact that candidate lists are employed and up to three can be elected give more chance to a female candidate. Her chance is also increased thanks to the absence of party competition there is only one legal party, the Communist Party of Vietnam.
Another important factor is the nature of political parties. In this aspect, Vietnam provides a good example. Get to Know Us. English Choose a language for shopping. Amazon Music Stream millions of songs. Amazon Advertising Find, attract, and engage customers. Amazon Drive Cloud storage from Amazon. Alexa Actionable Analytics for the Web. AmazonGlobal Ship Orders Internationally. Amazon Inspire Digital Educational Resources. Amazon Rapids Fun stories for kids on the go.
Why did the US find it so Difficult to Disengage from the Vietnam War before 1975?
Amazon Restaurants Food delivery from local restaurants. Is it at all possible to conceive of a German republicanism along French lines, a kind of Federal Republican civisme? What do German conservatives wish to conserve? Which peculiar forms did anticommunism and anti-Americanism take in the divided country—and have Germans managed to construct a lasting democratic anti-totalitarianism, as many post-war liberal thinkers set out to do?
It starts with the premise that political thought is subject to both logical and cultural constraints. Intellectual history, cultural history, social history, and political history cannot be properly separated in a thorough investigation of the history of political thought. Throughout, analysis and genealogy of political thought will be combined.
To chart the ideological landscape of post-war West Germany, the contributors put particular emphasis on shared patterns of thought—rather than single-thinker exegesis. The chapters also focus on ideological concepts that are essential to creating consensus and dissensus in German political argument, which therefore are particularly useful in illuminating German political culture more broadly.
Instead, they carefully explicate the cultural and institutional bases of German political argument: German scholars themselves, after decades of focusing on social and economic history as supposedly inherently progressive disciplines, are only now warming to cultural history, while also reluctantly returning to political and diplomatic history.
This collection cannot in any sense be comprehensive. It can, however, outline some of the contours of political thought in Germany after , given the peculiar constellation of democratization in a divided nation, the shadows of the Nazi past, and the overpowering presence of the culture and political values of the United States, as well as the Cold War rivalry with the GDR. Political thought also has to be related to German political culture more widely.
Theoretical debates about toleration, for instance, which have gained increasing salience in recent years, cannot be understood without a larger tableau of the particular relationship between state and church in Germany, which is different from that in most other Western nations, the United States and France in particular. In addition, the mixture of liberalism and illiberalism in the way the law treats foreigners in Germany has to be understood before discussion of the options for German republicanism can proceed. Understanding these differences will help to make sense of current and future clashes of different political conceptions of Europe.
And how do intellectuals adapt to a regime that might merely be an ideological second best for them—in particular the kind of Vernunftrepublikaner, the democrats out of reasonableness rather than conviction, who arguably contributed much to the downfall of the Weimar Republic? Pangloss at the Rhine Is the evolution of German political thought since a linear democratic success story? As always, it is easier— and safer—to praise worlds once they have passed into history.
This success story is a true story, but it is only one story. Just how Western was West Germany? The argument that we cannot take part [in military missions abroad] because of our history no longer holds true. After the failure of modernization theory and the waning of theories about a special and pathological German path, or Sonderweg, to modernity, such meta-narratives are rightly viewed with a great deal of skepticism. Still, exceptionalism remains an attractive historiographical parlor game—but its epistemological status and ultimate usefulness are in doubt even to the most sympathetic observers of the game.
Yet, the questions will not go away; something needs to be explained, and one has to make use of the best conceptual tools available. After all, there was a profound transformation of political culture and political argument, and some conceptual scheme is necessary to give a coherent account of it.
Therefore, while we do not want to return to the metaphysics of the Sonderweg, the persistent question of German peculiarities will be addressed in every chapter. All contributors will explain the specific use they are making of concepts such as Westernization and situate their accounts in broad comparative frameworks. What emerges, then, is a more complex picture of multiple integrations, in which there was a broad movement of Westernization—in the sense of a conscious adoption of Anglo-American political and cultural models—but in which old and new German ideologies also came to be intertwined with various intellectual imports.
As students of American influence have long recognized, such processes of assimilation are never one-way streets, and never result in simple imitations. The Invention of an Ironic Nation Who have been the protagonists of the gradual liberalization and Westernization of German political thought?
Gesellschaft became not only the object of study for sociologists, but, one might say, also their normative goal. Unlike in the history departments, younger scholars in sociology such as Habermas, Dahrendorf, and M. As Anson Rabinbach shows in his chapter on post-war journals, there were intellectual as well as political reasons why the nationalist Right and the Weimar Left both disappeared from the spectrum of post-war thought.
In the same vein, the establishment of a democratic political science could not displace older traditions overnight in a post-war situation that had to have been profoundly ambivalent as Nazi ideology had lost its hold, while democracy had yet to take root.
These ideas fitted perfectly into the neo-humanist political language of the s and allowed for what one might call the adoption of American-style democracy through the back door. While there were multiple restorations in the s, then, one might say that there were also multiple integrations— military and economic, but also political, intellectual, and normative. It also helped to integrate West Germany into a broadly liberal, Keynesian economic consensus.
In short, there was what Jerry Z. In the s, the most prominent debate about which direction the new polity was supposed to take on the basis of the constitution involved conservative defenders of the Rechtsstaat [rule of law] and advocates of an expanding Sozialstaat [welfare state].
The former argued that the traditional line between state and society was becoming increasingly blurred, as the welfare state required ever more discretion for the administration and as the rise of material law would cause more and more legal indeterminacy. The proponents of the Sozialstaat, on the other hand, sought to refute these claims, and argued that the Basic Law in fact mandated an extensive welfare state.
While the proponents of state-mandated socialism did not carry the day, their efforts were crucial in decentering an older German ideology of the state and opening the path toward an acceptance of the view that state and society should interact rather than be rigidly separated. But figures like Habermas and Luhmann set the tone for an intellectual climate that could never quite be contaminated again by the kind of extremist political enthusiasm of earlier decades of the twentieth century.
In many ways, what Benjamin Constant claimed about the bourgeois nineteenth century also fit the Federal Republic: The Volksgemeinschaft finally gave way to the Gesellschaftsvolk, to use an expression by Thomas Mann. There is hardly any literature on the changing nature of West German conservatism, which was faced with a large ideological dilemma after This sober, functionalist, and sometimes subtly ironic view of tradition came to be a hallmark of West German conservatism. It ostensibly modernized German conservatism but also continued strands of thought that had been characteristic of the Third Reich—which, of course, itself had its modernizing aspects.
Muller, on the other hand, demonstrates and defends with a case study the peculiar nature and ambivalence of German neo-conservatism. Clearly, German neo-conservatism, like other versions of this particular ideology, involved disillusioned liberals and Social Democrats. Yet, as Muller demonstrates, the German neo-conservatives never went as far in either their moralism or libertarianism as their counterparts in other countries. In many cases, their thought also did not have a strong religious background. In that sense, unlike other Western European countries and in the United States, neoconservatism remained much closer to classical forms of liberalism.
The conservative thought of the post-war period that is likely to last is arguably that of the great ironists like Luhmann, Thomas Nipperdey, and Johannes Gross, who renewed a German tradition of ironic conservatism that reaches back to Thomas Mann. Instead, they simply sought a sober, disenchanted democratic functionalism—even if that functionalism retained traces of a kind of bureaucratic authoritarianism. Above all, it came to be much less nationalist than Christian Democratic and right-wing parties either in the German past or in other Western countries.
For one thing, remains an event in search of an interpretation. Even this process, however, is in danger of entangling myth and history further. But, I argue, ultimately theory and praxis could not be mediated—instead, some of the radicals sought to short-circuit the hard labor of theory altogether by engaging in direct action. The final section focuses on the developing strands of republican thought in Germany.
Republicanism might strike the reader as an odd ideology in the German context. On the other hand, Islamic religious teaching is now firmly established in state schools, with the Berlin-based Islamic Federation having won a number of crucial court cases to have the right to give instructions alongside Catholic and Protestant teachings. How are these developments to fit together? German republicans are eager to avoid the intolerant and exclusionist elements traditionally associated with, for instance, French republicanism.
Postnationalism along Habermasian lines was certainly one of the ideological peculiarities of the Bonn Republic. According to Habermas, Germans have been forced by their catastrophic past to question their national traditions and conventional communitarian accounts of morality. Instead of centering political belonging on national culture and a glorious past, they had to fashion a constitutional patriotism grounded in the universalist principles of liberal democracy and a critical examination of their traditions.
Rainer Forst asks whether Germany is now a tolerant republic, and, in providing a paradoxical answer, excavates different concepts of toleration that are at work in German political culture. He argues that a peculiar combination of liberal-democratic values with Christian faith makes for a rather restricted conception of toleration, which, however, has deep roots in German history, and, in certain respects, continues to define the ideological essence of the Federal Republic.
Especially, if conceptions of European citizenship are to become more substantial, these traditions have to be taken into account—and, at the same time, fundamentally renegotiated. Farewell to the Bonn Republic The German political theorist Ernst Vollrath, a student of Hannah Arendt, once forcefully argued that there is a peculiar German perception of the political, which oscillates between a hard-nosed, amoral Realpolitik and an idealization of the political as potentially peaceful discourse.
Many of the thinkers presented here were indeed preoccupied with questions of state stability and social cohesion—as one would expect, given the specter of Weimar but also the authoritarian traditions of German Staatsrechtslehre, the old-fashioned public law doctrines which held that a strong state should stand above and order an always potentially unruly society. A strong desire to reduce conflict even when conflict is contained within democratic constraints—sometimes going so far as to want to end conflict for good—has been present in ideologies of the Right and the Left.
Yet, irony and utility also increasingly proved their uses when dealing with ideological and social conflict. After all, as Norbert Elias pointed out many years ago, the capacity for self-control in the context of conflict, the ability to gain some distance and strive for mediation, is part of a long, sometimes painful process of acquiring a democratic civilization—and civility. This increasingly Panglossian picture smoothes over the political paradoxes of the Federal Republic—and, not least, its provinciality, which might have been intimately bound up with its protected nature.
Above all, it fails to acknowledge that the old Federal Republic saw its fair share of conflict—in fact, more so than the Berlin Republic. Clearly, this volume is able to throw light on only a few of the political traditions and patterns of thought that have become characteristic of post-war Germany. For now, the purpose of this volume will be fulfilled if it allows historians and political theorists to tap into the rich veins of German political thought, while also sensitizing them to its specific historical and particularly cultural contexts.
University of California Press, See also Louis Dumont, German Ideology: From France to Germany and Back Chicago: University of Chicago Press, , and George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Gesine Schwan, Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: German Socialist Intellectuals and Totalitarianism Urbana: Metzler, , 1—7. Indispensable as background to the investigation of German concepts remains Reinhart Koselleck et al. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, 8 vols.
The last point is of particular relevance. On the position of the Constitutional Court and its fraught relationship with politics, see Donald P. On the ongoing struggle between social and cultural historians, see Thomas Mergel and Thomas Welskopp eds. For the s, see Robert G. Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre Munich: Oldenbourg, , Hanna Schissler ed. Princeton UP, , and Klaus Naumann ed. For the best historical overview of the Bonn Republic, see Anthony J.
Nicholls, The Bonn Republic: West German Democracy, — London: Trust, Justice, and Democratization Cambridge, Mass.: Essays in Honor of Peter Pulzer Oxford: Oxford UP, , — On these questions, see also the discussion in A. German Politics and Society, vol. Leske und Budrich, Selbstentwurf und Selbstbeschreibung im Democracy, Prosperity, and Nationhood Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Otherwise excellent books prone to turning into tales of final arrival are Axel Schildt, Ankunft im Westen: Somewhat in this vein, see Nolte, Die Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft.
On the decline of statism in particular, see Gregg O. Loyalty and Political Membership New York: Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. See, above all, Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre: Einleitung in die Rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik Leipzig: For use of modernization as the main concept to understand post-war transformations, see Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek eds.
Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre Bonn: Vier Thesen zur Zeitgeschichte Stuttgart: DVA, , 67— Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im Amerika in der Bundesrepublik Hamburg: See also Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen. It is an open question whether Europeanization might be added to these concepts. Arguably, there is now less of a serious European conversation about fundamental political questions than there was before the establishment of the EU.
Given the relentless pressures of academic specialization, the kind of broadly 18 Collingwood, and Carl Schmitt, seems to have become extinct. See for instance Heide Fehrenbach and Uta G. James Ceaser, Reconstructing America: This preeminence of sociology is convincingly explained by Nolte, Die Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft, Columbia UP, , ; here 7. On the role of West German intellectuals in general, see my Another Country: See also Volker R. Granta, , and Michael Hochgeschwender, Freiheit in der Offensive?
Piper, , For the idea of multiple restorations, see Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: On the social market economy, see Anthony J. Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility: Heinz Bude, Die ironische Nation: Soziologie als Zeitdiagnose Hamburg: Clemens Albrecht et al. The Paradoxes of Differentiation Stanford: Critic in the Public Sphere London: A Philosophical-Political Profile Lanham: Was leistet die Sozialforschung? Cambridge UP, , 51—83; here Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, 1— Mann quoted by Nolte, Die Ordnung der Gesellschaft, For the problems faced by conservative thought in the post-war world more generally, see Robert Devigne, Recasting Conservatism: Piper, , and Axel Schildt, Konservatismus in Deutschland: Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart Munich: Die deutsche Rechte im Widerstreit ihrer Ideen — Darmstadt: Suhrkamp, , 95— Sunil Khilnani, Arguing Revolution: Yale UP, , Beck, , — Axel Schildt, Ankunft im Westen.
Metzler, , — Suhrkamp, , 92—; here See also Richard Herzinger, Republik ohne Mitte: Ein politischer Essay Berlin: Norbert Elias, The Germans: Eric Dunning and Stephen Mennell Cambridge: Die deutsche Vergangenheit und die Politik von morgen Stuttgart: A historiographical war about the interpretation of the Federal Republic is well under way. See for instance Kurt Sontheimer, So war Deutschland nie: Anmerkungen zur politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Munich: Shortly after the German surrender on May 8, , at a time when one might expect other concerns to take precedence, a heated and protracted debate over what to do about the venerable site was already in full swing.
On one side of the controversy were the noted architects of the German Werkbund who saw the loss of the original house as an opportunity for a new building in a more appropriately modern style. On the other were the city fathers and Goethe enthusiasts who believed that the house should be rebuilt exactly as it had been. As the left-wing Catholic intellectual Walter Dirks wrote at the time: The Goethe house would be rebuilt unchanged according to the original architectural plans on the old site. On the fifth of July , the cornerstone was laid.
For Dirks the decision to reconstruct the old Goethe house was an event not of local but of national significance. However, it is a one-sided allegory, leaving out the fact that with the defeat of the Nazis, the occupying forces encouraged a more complex intellectual and cultural reconstruction, even if avant-garde and radical currents so prevalent during the Weimar years did not make a significant comeback.
The restorative tendencies described by Dirks came to the fore only after a brief, but intellectually vital, period of confrontation with the Nazi past during the first years after the war had given way to the more conservative era accompanied by the Cold War.
Crawford - Petrosklad
More than a decade ago, the historian Karl Dietrich Bracher distinguished three competing trends in the reestablishment of German intellectual life after The first, he said, was a conservative desire for the restoration of Europe and its values; the second a turn toward the left and a rejection of all right-wing dictatorships; and the third, a reaction against communist totalitarianism in East Central Europe. The second was dominated by men and women who were born between and and whose life experience was largely shaped by the events of the s and s, like Johannes R.
Of these three generations, the latter was far more oriented toward the United States and toward a more pluralistic, American-style democracy. An even younger generation, we might add, founded important periodicals not in Germany, but in places like Fort Van Etten Rhode Island , where Der Ruf founded in was the periodical of left-wing German prisoners of war edited by Walter Schoenstedt, who was an American officer, and by the writer Alfred Andersch.
Second, I will examine the constellation of a few keywords that played a crucial role in the intellectual discourse that emerged during the immediate post-war era. In short, I am interested in the relationship between the institutional foundation of post-war German intellectual life and its conceptual foundation. Despite difficulties caused by the strict licensing requirements imposed by the Allies—above all an antifascist orientation—endemic paper shortages, financial exigencies of the currency reform, and a palpable lack of heat in the offices, German intellectual life during the late s was much more intellectually vigorous than in the s.
Their absence from the scene was paralleled by the suspicion that accompanied the few antifascist intellectuals who tried to rebuild their careers after the war. A case in point is Werner Krauss, the distinguished romance literature scholar who had been imprisoned and sentenced to death by the Gestapo and who was allowed to join the editorial board of Die Wandlung only at the insistence of the American authorities.
After a short period in Heidelberg, Krauss crossed over to the Soviet zone, where he continued his academic career. In the case of Der Spiegel, founded in Hannover in , Rudolf Augstein assumed the editorship only after three of its four original editors were denied a license to assume their posts because of their activities in the Third Reich.
Becher, who was the most prominent cultural figure in that zone. If their editors were in part chosen for having remained in Nazi Germany, the new journals strongly reflected the cultural orientation of the respective occupying powers, in both political and literary matters.
In fact, history seems to be the missing dimension in the first post-war years. The Historikerverband was founded in , the first Historikertag did not convene until , and a historical journal was not published in Germany until the early s. He was one of the first to make explicit the connection between a Germany bound to the memory of the Nazi past and the reconstitution of its political existence: With only the barest hint of the difficult issues posed by the presence of its French patron, Merkur emphasized the pan-European dimensions of the Nazi experience: Though Becher shared with the communist party leaders Ulbricht and Pieck the hope that the SBZ would soon become a full-fledged German communist state, his nationalism was not entirely strategic.
At one point, Becher even tried to mediate between Mann and Thiess in their famous dispute. Tulpanov frequently told German communists who wanted to apply more stringent denazification measures to instead read the works of Marx and Engels, which, as his critics could readily see, did not offer much practical advice as to how to denazify conductors, writers, actors, or directors. Consequently, the high modernism of Weimar, Paris, and New York in the s and s enjoyed a tremendous revival during the s. Die Wandlung published T.
Clearly, these journals reflected a highly selective relationship to the German past, preferring to ignore rather than confront those elements of pre German intellectual life that were not restored to public life after As Jeffrey Herf points out, the volkisch-nationalist Right, whose political and cultural proximity to National Socialism was self-evident, was prohibited public expression.
But it is also true that outright criticism of the Conservative Revolution was also markedly absent, perhaps because, as Jaspers said of his own refusal to publicly condemn Heidegger after the war, he held him in too high esteem, or because, as Sternberger privately admitted was the case with Die Wandlung, fairness did not permit him to attack writers who could not defend themselves.
It is also apparent that those writers who refused to accommodate with the occupying powers, and who either remained silent or wrote very little, still enjoyed enormous support among cultural elites, a fact which any public controversy was sure to underscore. Also absent in the Western zones, as well as in the SBZ, were the main figures of the Weimar left, especially those who had espoused heterodox Marxist views and who were associated with the cultural and political avant-garde.
Four keywords appear with astonishing regularity in all the intellectual reviews founded in the Western zones in immediate post-war Germany. It is to these keywords that I will now turn to analyze post-war intellectual developments more closely. In his opening remarks Jaspers emphasized his larger purpose: The suffering of the Jews in exile was the path to inner purity and collective redemption. For Jaspers, the Germans too, in an astonishing reversal, had now become a people deprived of their national existence and excluded from the community of nations because of the enormous suffering they had inflicted on others, above all, the Jews.
In the British zone the guilt question was dealt with either not at all or matter-of-factly, emphasizing the distinction popularized by Jaspers between collective responsibility and collective guilt. The main debate occurred in the American zone, where the writer Major Hans Habe edited Die Neue Zeitung, which, in contrast to other periodicals, invited the exiles to express their skepticism about the possibilities for German renewal.
The debates that followed revealed the often wide differences that emerged over different meanings of German guilt, as well as the less apparent implication of the discourse itself, which, at least for Jaspers, precluded any further survival of the German nation-state. I feel that the same danger will repeat in the subsequent issues. It is no accident that the most divisive and vociferous controversy in Die Wandlung concerned the famous statement issued as the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt of the Evangelical Church in October Nor were they limited to disgruntled readers.
Im Spiegel und der Deutschen Telewischen. Instead, the regime was perceived as lacking in any doctrinal or ideological commitments, as an amoralism without intellectual foundations.
- Countess So Shameless (A Scandal in London Novel Book 1)?
- Listen and Learn (Learning to Get Along, Book 2) (Learning to Get Along®).
- Regierungsstruktur, Parlament und Parteiensystem in Schweden.
Organized as a series of duels between the polarities of post-war discourse—freedom versus justice, socialism versus Christianity, national versus universal values—the stirrings of the Cold War were everywhere in evidence. As one speaker put it, America was characterized by freedom without justice, the Soviet Union, by justice without freedom. His presentation was a tour de force of Marxist exposition, the Big Picture that encompassed the partial perspectives of all of the previous speakers.
Ranging from Homer to Lao Tse to Marx, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard, from the ancient Jews to the modern Germans, he drew a picture of the origins of the great civilizations, the preeminence of European science and technology, its power, and its inevitable fall into nihilism. We are always in it, not outside it or above it. In , behind the controversy over Goethean humanism was of course the larger question of German guilt. It is for them that I have spoken. Those politics, still thoroughly discredited by Nazism, remained, as I have argued, largely underground.
By the new discourse of guilt, with its religiosity, and the talk of the crisis of humanism was dispelled, the hope of a unified Europe postponed. Instead, the old cultural structure was not so much lovingly rebuilt as replaced by a museal version of humanism, just as the old Goethehaus was replaced by an exact replica rather than a restoration.
What resulted was, as Dirks predicted, what unavoidably must result from such a dubious enterprise: Sozialismus oder Restauration, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. Ammann, , —3. Karl Dietrich Bracher, Zeit der Ideologien: Eine Geschichte politischen Denkens im Saur, , Wer war an Hitler schuld? Minerva, , Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, , Merkur I , Stanford UP, , Oxford UP, , The discussion is elaborated in Pike, The Politics of Culture, Zum 80 Geburtstag Karl Jaspers Munich: Piper, , , University of California Press, , chapter 4.
Aufzeichnungen der Jahre —, ed. Suhrkamp, , Dial, , Philip Reclam, , Renato de Rosa, ed. Verlag Lambert Schneider, , Cited in Pike, The Politics of Culture. Peter Lang, , Dirks, Sozialismus oder Restauration, See for example Neues Abendland Augsburg. Karl Jaspers, The European Spirit, ed. Ronald Gregor Smith London: SCM Press, Ltd, , Pike, The Politics of Culture, In my opinion, no definitive answer has as yet been given to this question; however, it figures among the most difficult questions posed by West German post-war history.
- Regierungsstruktur, Parlament und Parteiensystem in Schweden by Nicole Haak on Apple Books.
- BOUGHT BY EDWARD STEEL (Edward Steel Trilogy Book 1);
In the beginning, a reference to a remarkable shift in the priorities of research in this field may suffice to at least delimit this question as far as the contribution of American occupation policy to the introduction of a democratic order is concerned. Despite all short-range failures, as they occurred, for instance, briefly in the educational policy or in the reform of public services, something like cumulative public learning processes must have contributed to the growing identification with the new democracy. First, this discipline was itself undergoing a strenuous foundation process and thus reflected in miniature the initial difficulties of democracy within the larger framework of the political order; second, due to its disciplinary and methodological orientation, it embodied, per definitionem, a direct relation with contemporary political life, i.
In many respects decisive, however, proved to be a small group of emigrants who looked back on successful careers as political scientists in the American exile and who had already offered their help to the American authorities during the war.