I found this book, bought it and have been reading it to her since I was about twenty weeks pregnant. It is aimed at two to three year olds, but it has nice pictures and simple language, making it perfect for young children. It is a great starting point, and has space at the back to write in the child's details as well as specific information about where they came from, for example anything you know about the donor. Definitely worth the money. One person found this helpful.
Based on a couple using a sperm donor not a single person. Arrived folded and tatty. Both myself and my 4 year old enjoy this book. I enjoyed reading it to her, and I particularly like the illustrations. It arrived on time as well. Great book to explain to 3 year olds about how they came about. Easy for kids to understand. See all 4 reviews. Most helpful customer reviews on Amazon. We happen to be a male-female couple that used sperm donation to conceive our first child for various reasons. We are always looking for good books to talk about this concept as well as how families can be created in so many ways.
This book tells the story of a "pea" that is basically a little boy with a pea and leaf for a head. He is probably around years old as jokes about eggs mom's vs. Little kid humor that I don't find particularly offensive. Probably something that a six year old will say if they hear about sperm. The story continues to explain that the pea's mommy and daddy also peas, of course couldn't make a baby pea because of daddy's sperm not working. They leave it at that. So, the parents go to a "Very Good Doctor" and get sperm from a "Very Kind Man" that has a lot of extra sperm available.
The doctor then puts mommy's egg and donor sperm together to make a baby pea and put that in the mommy's tummy. So, clearly this is for male-female couples right off so not for two women, etc. We personally didn't see a very good doctor at all. Honestly, most of the doctors we saw were pretty horrible to us so we ended up buying sperm on our own and having my regular midwife provider do an IUI. So, I could do without the praising of the amazing doctor who made it all happen, but I'm sure that's common enough for many folks. The idea of putting the sperm and egg together and placing it in mommy's tummy doesn't fit our IUI story and hints at IVF.
Not explicitly, but if this is concerning for you, be aware. The sperm donor seems to be more of a known donor since they picture him there, but there's also verbiage saying the doctor found this man so I think it can cover anonymous donors like ours well enough. It is a short story of about 20 pages with little text on each page. The vocabulary is basic enough for pretty early readers most likely.
The story has the above limits and doesn't work for us really well, but it's much closer to our situation than, say, a book that details IVF with two mommies yay for IVF with two mommies! Just not our story. The artwork is fair. The book is all shades of yellow-green peas. I felt like I was in the middle of those early genetic lessons in which you cross a green and yellow pea and then figure out what percentage of offspring will be green or yellow.
Would have liked to had it say "him" for our situation, but whatever. We have plenty of info on our donor in other places and don't really need that here. But it might really bother someone, who knows. For us, the book is about a 3 star purchase. Close to our situation, but not quite, and really not the greatest text or artwork. If your situation more closely matches the above descriptions and you are okay with green-yellow and kid humor, then it might be a four star book.
Wherever you fall, congratulations on the little miracle brought into your life by donation! Ours is the delight of our life, even if we might never find a book that tells our story perfectly. This is an excellent book that explains sperm donation perfectly for a young child. This book was recommended by a friend going through sperm donation as well. My husband and I didn't go through a doctor for insemination but I still think it's a cute introduction of the donor process for a child.
The men recruited for the study were not sperm donors. Would sperm donors react the same way? As Cohen and Coan put it: Sperm banks are notoriously selective in who they permit to donate, including screening many individuals based on family medical history and how well their sperm freezes. Indeed, upwards of 90 per cent of individuals who make initial contact with a sperm bank in the U. That said, this particular limitation does not seem overly troubling for two reasons. First, we have no reason to suspect interactions between the kinds of things that would screen an individual out from being a sperm donor and their responsiveness to the treatment vs.
Second, most of the criteria sperm banks currently use for screening are not fixed, and sperm banks might change their criteria if they faced changes in the number of willing donors. This has been a strategy used by many foreign countries in the wake of changing their policy on anonymity. In order to overcome this limitation of our prior work, this paper represents the first attempt to examine the same questions using actual anonymous sperm donors. We conducted an experiment to assess the effect of a change in donor identification rules on the willingness of subjects to donate and the price required to ensure continued donation.
The study was administered from June 15, to August 15, using a sample of active and inactive donors from a large cryobank in the USA. The bank had multiple locations and employs recruitment efforts similar to other large US banks. Of the respondents in our sample, 90 are or were anonymous donors and 71 are or were ID donors. Our experimental design employed follows closely the prior work of Cohen and Coan. Subjects in the treatment condition were asked to carefully read the following information on the UK system prior to answering the questionnaire:.
Many developed nations require sperm donors to be identified, typically requiring new sperm donors to put identifying information into a registry that is made available to a donor-conceived child once they reach the age of Recently, advocates have pressed U. The donor would have no legal rights to contact the offspring; the decision to initiate contact is solely that of the donor-conceived child. Donors are protected from any kind of parental responsibility by state and federal law. The treatment was designed to communicate efficiently the most salient features of UK donor laws and thus provide a realistic opportunity for donors to assess the costs associated with a change in the law.
C for additional details. Subjects in the control condition did not receive any information on mandatory identification rules. That is, the only difference between the treatment and control conditions was the provision of information on UK identification rules. There is no shortage of different elicitation formats in the literature, ranging from simple open-ended questions to more complicated dichotomous choice designs. Specifically, subjects in the treatment condition received the following question: We employ the open-ended CV format for both practical and methodological reasons. First, dichotomous choice methods require considerable sample sizes to ensure efficient estimation, 43 which are infeasible to meet given the overall size of the available donor pool in the USA, and certainly at any one sperm bank.
In contrast, the open-ended format offers a highly efficient use of information. Second, dichotomous choice models are appropriate—and often necessary—when subjects have limited information on the valuation decision.
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Cohen and Coan make a similar argument when using a convenience sample of males in the USA, most of which have never donated sperm in the past. While the active donors were highly responsive to our questionnaire, inactive donors registered a response rate of 46 per cent. Although survey non-response does not necessarily imply non-response bias, 45 it is useful to identify any major imbalances in key demographics across our data and the sampling frame. We have some auxiliary information from which we can screen for imbalances.
More specifically, we were able to obtain aggregate information on the age, race percent white , religion percent Christian , and marital status at the time of donation percent married for individuals contacted as part of our study. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of how close our respondents are to the sampling frame for each of the available demographic indicators. As demonstrated in Fig. Our sample is a little higher than expected in the 25 to 29 age category and a bit lower in the 30 to 35 category.
In general, the distributions are similar, which in turn improves our confidence that major imbalances are unlikely and thus mitigates the potential for non-response bias in this subsample none of the observed differences are statistically different from zero. Assessing non-response among inactive donors.
Note that none of the observed differences are statistically different from zero. From a policy perspective, it is also worth noting that the active donors are probably the more important pool to measure. If the US regime changes from permitting to prohibiting anonymous sperm donation, active rather than inactive donors will likely be the first population from which sperm banks will try to recruit. Although this may be viewed as a limitation of our design, it is important to note that this was an extremely difficult—and expensive—sample to attain and it improves on existing experimental studies of policy change and donor compensation.
To gauge donor reactions to the mandatory identification treatment , we focus on two primary outcomes measures: These two measures allow one to effectively capture key points in a donor's decision calculus. That is, when faced with a mandatory identification law, donors must first choose whether to remain in the market and then—conditional on their decision to continue donating—specify the financial incentive necessary to participate.
Cohen and Coan 48 demonstrate that the commonly employed exponential WTA function was appropriate when valuing sperm donation both in pre-test data and in a convenience sample of potential donors. And given that the current study employs an experimental design very similar to the approach used in Cohen and Coan, we are confident regarding the usefulness of this specification in the current context.
There are also a number of challenges specific to modeling WTA data. Although relying on an open-ended question offers benefits in terms of efficiency, this elicitation format is susceptible to so-called protest bids. Not adjusting for these extreme cases—especially given current sample sizes—has the potential to heavily influence reported differences across groups and yet there is no agreed upon method for treating these bids in the literature.
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As a middle ground between these two extremes, one might also advocate treating extreme observations as censored and estimate models to accurately censoring in WTA data. With little theoretical guidance as to which assumption is more appropriate in the context of past and present sperm donors, we estimate the WTA of donation under a range of different scenarios. First, when considering the full sample of both active and inactive donors see Fig. Second, when restricting the subsample of active donors see Fig. Yet, even assuming a lower-bound estimate of an approximate 7 per cent refusal rate, the potential economic implications of a change in identification laws remains considerable.
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The effect of mandatory identification on refusal to donate. When considering those individuals that would still consider donating, the obvious question remains: What price is needed to ensure continued participation? Figure 3 provides the estimated effect of receiving the treatment under a range of different assumptions. In economic terms, this difference is considerable: The effect of mandatory identification on WTA. The estimates assume an exponential WTA function and are based on a log-normal regression. Including protest bids in the WTA estimate may overstate the effect of mandatory identification laws on the necessary level of donor compensation.
How sensitive is this estimate to alternative assumptions on extreme bids? To explore this question, we present estimates under a range of assumptions regarding extreme observations. Turning first to the censored estimates Fig.
While about half of the censored regression estimate under similar assumptions, this effect still represents economically meaningful change in the price of sperm. Our study is the first to examine how current US sperm donors would react to legal change requiring identification of those donors through a registry system of the kind in place in the United Kingdom, the most plausible policy alternative. We find that such a change would have significant effects. Our results generally suggest that changes in mandatory identification rules have a considerable impact on an individual's preference regarding donation.
First, in terms of the willingness to donate at all under a regime that required identification, Cohen and Coan found that not a single individual from the general public refused to donate when exposed to the mandatory identification treatment condition. All else equal, this reaction would imply a considerable drop in the current number of available donors.
It is possible the effect is even larger because our design determines whether active donors would donate or not with a change in the law, but does not determine whether those active donors willing to donate might reduce the amount of donation should the law change—though to be fair the opposite reaction is possible, if less plausible.
When considering the actual cost increase associated with mandatory identification laws, it is market , not individual, reactions that are paramount. How will the market for sperm donors react to such a change in law? Unfortunately, detailed information identifying supply and demand are not publicly available—yet, we can still assess the plausibility of a range of scenarios under alternative assumptions. We first outline a scenario in which changes in the law have little influence on price.
If we assume that demand is relatively inelastic unresponsive to price and the pool of potential donors is much larger than current demand, then a change in the law should have a nominal impact on the actual price. Moreover, given that each donation can be spread over multiple vials, the actual increase in production cost passed on to consumers may be quite modest.
There are, however, a number of features associated with the US market that challenge this optimism. For sought after donor profiles, the market is often quite thin and thus a double-digit decline in the current donor pool could prove significant. In the end, considerable uncertainty remains regarding the likely market reaction to mandatory donor identification rules and what this means for price.
Further, the expected effect of donor laws turns on what one is willing to assume regarding the size of the potential pool of donors and how sensitive individuals not in the current donor pool are to price. Yet, it is important to note that even a pessimistic view on a potential increase in the price of sperm would nonetheless still imply a cost well below the current price paid for donor eggs.
Actual sperm donors seem to be a more ecologically valid sample from which to draw these estimates. We can offer two hypotheses for why these numbers differ from Cohen and Coan, each of which has different implications for policy:. For this reason it is possible that our results represent a transitional effect, such that new populations of sperm donors might be more willing to participate in an identification-required regime and demand less payment closer to that in Cohen and Coan. Indeed, upward of 90 per cent of individuals who make initial contact with a sperm bank in the USA are not chosen to become sperm donors.
That said, there are likely elements of the existing standards whose importance is beyond cavil—lack of STI or other serious genetic diseases and the ability for sperm to freeze well and thus produce successful offspring when thawed. A different way of contextualizing our results is by comparison to international experience. To lose roughly a third of one's donor is no doubt a significant problem for most sperm banks.
But certainly the effect would be smaller than that reported in the observational studies in the literature in Sweden. In the three years after its law changed, Sweden saw the number of new donors per year decline from to 30 though these are new donors. Much of the world has moved to prohibiting sperm donor anonymity. In the midst of an ongoing bioethics debate, there are those who advocate that the USA adopt a model of registering sperm donors and making their identities available to offspring at age 18, the model the United Kingdom adopted.
One major concern is that such a change would result in shortages of sperm donors.
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This study is the first to examine how existing sperm donors would react to such a change. We find that in our preferred specifications 28 per cent of sperm donors at a large US sperm bank would refuse to participate if anonymity is prohibited. Our findings suggest that such a change would have a significant, but perhaps not insurmountable, effect on the supply of sperm in the USA should the law change.
We hope that this study creates a foundation for other research in this area. A few particular projects would be interesting to pursue: Across the world the law changes have affected not only men but also women who serve as egg donors. It would be useful to understand whether egg donors have similar or different reactions to law changes prohibiting donor anonymity. While this has been the main disclosure regime put into place across the world, one can imagine other possible approaches including providing the information directly to children at age 18 regardless of whether they call in to find out, giving donors the right to contact the children, maintaining the UK-type registry but making the information on the donor available to children at a younger age, and so forth.
A final suggestion for further research came from one of the paper's reviewers who suggested that we might also repeat our study with sperm donor applicants , rather than those who had been accepted as sperm donors. They also thank Russell Spivak for excellent research assistance. Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide.
Sign In or Create an Account. Close mobile search navigation Article navigation. Sperm donor anonymity and compensation: Abstract Most sperm donation that occurs in the USA proceeds through anonymous donation. View large Download slide. We model the first stage in this decision process using logistic regression and the second stage using the parametric WTA model outlined in Cohen and Coan To remain consistent with past scholarship, 47 we utilize the standard exponential WTA function: Opening Pandora's Box , 13 J.
The Pea that was Me: A Sperm Donation Story: Volume 2: ywukakyzin.ml: Kimberly Kluger-Bell: Books
Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: A Question of Anonymity , 85 Fertil. An Experiment , 10 J. See eg Rebecca Johns, Abolishing Anonymity: