Second Samoan Civil War. Samoa United Kingdom United States. Venezuelan crisis of — Venezuela  Supported by: Dervish State Supported by: Finland   White Guard   Supported by: Red Guards   Supported by: Russian SFSR  . Combatant 1 Won  . Revolutions and interventions in Hungary. Turkish War of Independence.
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Ankara Government Supported by: Combatant 2 Won   . Soviet Union  . Combatant 2 Won  . Standard Oil alleged . Argentina     Royal Dutch Shell alleged . Greece   Supported by: Imperial State of Iran Supported by: Combatant 1 Won  . Internal conflict in Myanmar. Stalemate   . Mau Mau rebels [A] Supported by: United Kingdom British Kenya Supported by: Combatant 1 Won .
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First Taiwan Strait Crisis. People's Republic of China Supported by: Republic of China United States. First Sudanese Civil War.
Egypt  Palestinian fedayeen Supported by: French and UK power in area weakened . Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. People's Republic of China. Tibet Chushi Gangdruk Supported by: Simba and Kwilu rebels Supported by: Democratic Republic of the Congo Supported by: Portugal  Supported by: Combatant 2 Won . Republic of Iraq Ba'athist Iraq Supported by: Eritrean War of Independence.
Ethiopian Empire until Supported by: Yemen Arab Republic Egypt  Supported by: Oman  Supported by: Insurgency in Northeast India. Constitutionalists Dominican Revolutionary Party  Supported by: Communist insurgency in Thailand. Korean DMZ Conflict — North Korea Supported by: South African Border War. United States Far-right terrorist groups: Communist insurgency in Malaysia. Opponents to the military juntas and right-wing governments in South America. South Yemen Supported by: Saudi Arabia Supported by: Civil conflict in the Philippines.
Philippines Alsa Masa —? Yemenite War of North Yemen Supported by: People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Supported by: Indonesian occupation of East Timor. Indonesia Timor Timur Supported by: Laos Pathet Lao Pro- govt. Civil conflict in Turkey. Chittagong Hill Tracts conflict. Shanti Bahini Supported by: North Yemen Islamic Front Supported by: Iran  Small Maoist groups: Internal conflict in Peru.
Ethiopia Somali rebels Supported by: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Supported by: Thailand Supported by United States. Naxalite—Maoist insurgency [ citation needed ]. Indonesian occupation of East Timor [ citation needed ]. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict [ citation needed ]. Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Supported by Russia. Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. South Ossetia Supported by: But proxy wars should not be seen as synonymous with the Cold War. We are entering a new era of proxy war, and thus the indirect approach, for several reasons.
Firstly, the appeal of fighting an indirect war still rests on an intrinsic set of assumptions based on interest formation, ideological premises, and perceptions of risk. Collectively, this has meant that states are still reluctant to cede interest but are increasingly unwilling to bear the human and financial costs of maintaining it.
Proxy Warfare (WCMW - War and Conflict in the Modern World)
The result is a heightened appeal in the use of proxies as a means of securing national interest indirectly. Secondly, a new set of actors on the international political scene have emerged who are prime to become proxy war-wagers of the future, including private military companies and internet hackers.
These new warriors are able to be co-opted by states at a point when national military recruitment is waning and defence budgets squeezed. The literal outsourcing of military operations creates obvious conditions by which states fight wars indirectly. Thirdly, the inevitable consequence of the War on Terror on American political willingness to wage large-scale regime-changing wars is that the US will revert to engagement in proxy warfare to maximise their interests whilst minimising their political and military exposure.
Additional boots on the ground, especially in the Middle East, as a corollary to airpower exposes American foreign policy to the repetition of recent follies. There are few signs emanating from the Trump White House that there is an appetite in the new administration for extensive expeditionary military engagements. Although denoting a neo-isolationist turn, it remains to be seen whether President Trump will feel inclined to preserve American interests overseas through the utility of more proxies.
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- List of proxy wars.
Finally, we cannot ignore the role played by two key international players: The continuing rise of China as a global superpower raises significant questions as to how it will exert its presence internationally and whether this actually increases the likelihood of it engaging in proxy wars without damaging its trade relations with the West. The coercion of regional neighbours and territorial annexation inside Crimea in by Russia has opened up a policy dilemma for the West in regards to how Russian use of volunteers creates the scope for indirect war to be waged as part of a wider hybrid war strategy.
In short, it is a mode of warfare that we are likely to see more, and not less of, in the coming decades given the confluence of global power shifts, political recalibration, and strategic reassessment by key international players. The indirect approach, as envisaged by Liddell Hart, creates the conditions whereby an enemy is forced to realise that their own strategic objectives are unattainable without the need for direct or conventional use of force. This is in large part based on acute calculations of political risk and a desire to maximise self-interest that is greater than the will of an adversary to aggressively respond.
This in-built logic of deterrence is reinforced by other key components of proxy warfare, namely causal ambiguity victim states might be deterred from retaliating in a conventional way because of the unclear lines of responsibility for the initial attack. As a form of deterrence itself, the prosecution of proxy warfare by adversaries is arguably immune to rival forms of deterrence. The possession of nuclear weapons is therefore not enough to counter the resort to proxy warfare by competitor states, but it may prevent the escalation of hostilities that encompass direct modes of confrontation.
It is both ambiguous and attritional, ensuring that an enemy is weakened "by pricks instead of blows. The psychological component of the initial recourse to proxy war can be found in acute perceptions of the risks involved in undertaking alternative, more direct, forms of intervention. Christopher Coker has argued that the language and methods of risk analysis are applicable to the way that modern war is understood and conducted and that war has fundamentally "become risk management in all but name.
The desire by a state to avoid using overt, conventional possibly even nuclear force with obvious lines of responsibility denotes a decision influenced by the appeal of waging an indirect war in order to lever as much gain out of a pre-existing or newly manufactured conflict without the risk of being an outright combatant in a conventional war that is subject to normal channels of international legal scrutiny therefore reducing the chances of direct retaliation by the victim state.
The overarching purpose of the indirect approach is to reduce resistance within the mindset of enemy decision-makers. Proxy wars have been used for centuries as a way for states to indirectly manipulate the outcome of foreign wars just look at how Catholic Spain and Protestant France flocked to support their co-religionists in the Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years' War; or British support for the Confederacy during the American Civil War given the importance of the cotton trade. Indirect war has certainly had a perennial appeal.
However, proxy wars are rarely stopped in a way that inter-state wars or civil wars are stopped—through either victory by one side or a mediated peace agreement.
Many proxy wars tend to end because the proxy outgrows the relationship with the benefactor state. Increased autonomy for the proxy group negates the need for so much external assistance. Take Hizbullah for example. They were gradually able to independently gain enough weapons and money of their own that they weakened their ties with Iran and Syria—two countries who had been using Hizbullah to fight a proxy war with Israel. The history of proxy wars demonstrates how third party interference causes the prolonging of the initial bi-party conflict through the creation of stalemate conditions, which can alter the strategic perceptions of the target state.
Proxy Warfare - Andrew Mumford - Google Книги
As with all displacement activities rarely do they fulfil the ultimate objective. It lacks decisiveness, overwhelming force, or the provision of superior numbers. It can soften an enemy, erode their will, but it is not a strategy designed to produce an acknowledgeable battlefield win. Indeed, the best it can produce is a strategic impasse. Yet the increasingly risk averse nature of politically-minded and financially constrained strategic planning has embraced the idea of an indirect approach and eschewed the idea more out of hope than anything else that victory comes at the price of blood.
The blood price of modern war waged by the West is now largely for proxies to pay. Carl von Clausewitz famously described the fog of war to define the absence of information a commander has across a multitude of levels, from the tactical to the grand strategic. But proxy warfare represents the foggiest form of war given the deliberate obfuscations that occur in hiding the identity of the benefactor state.
“Proxy Warfare” By Andrew Mumford
Not knowing exactly who the enemy is presents the most fundamental of challenges to strategic formulation. To paraphrase General Sherman during the American Civil War, war waged by proxy puts the opponents on the horns of a dilemma: This is the precarious tightrope that policymakers and military strategists must tread when determining how to respond to the use of proxy warfare by other states in this new era of the indirect strategic approach. This article appeared originally at Strategy Bridge.
Faber and Faber, , p.